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Beyond Paternalism: Rethinking the
Limits of Public Health Law
WENDY E. PARMET
This response to David Friedman’s Public Health Regulation and the
Limits of Paternalism challenges his claim that the rejection of paternalism
creates a “limit” on public health law’s potential for addressing the
obesity epidemic and offers a defense of public health laws as exercises of
self-governance. The Article begins by showing why many of the laws that
Friedman classifies as paternalistic are not actually paternalistic. Nor are
most public health laws as unpopular as Friedman presumes. Moreover,
the public’s disapproval of some public health laws may be due to factors
other than their paternalism, including their origination at times by out-oftouch public health agencies. Public health laws, the Article argues, can
be justified as an exercise of self-governance; they should be the laws that
populations enact to protect their own health. When officials act without
regard to that popular foundation, as the New York City Board of Health
did in banning the sale of large portions of sugary soda, a backlash may
follow whether or not the law is paternalistic. Thus policymakers should
worry less about whether a proposed law is paternalistic and more about
whether it is responsive to the needs and concerns of the population it
seeks to protect.
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Beyond Paternalism: Rethinking the
Limits of Public Health Law
WENDY E. PARMET*
I. INTRODUCTION
“[P]aternalism,” David Friedman writes in his illuminating article,
“may have reached natural limits of effectiveness,” especially with respect
to public health.1 Given the public’s disdain for paternalism, Friedman
argues that paternalistic public health policies, particularly those
embodying hard paternalism, are destined to fail, as did New York City’s
ban on the sale of large sugary sodas.2 This rejection of paternalism,
Friedman argues, is deeply problematic for public health.3 As Friedman
sees it, many of the most critical public health problems of our times,
especially obesity, can be addressed only by implementing paternalistic,
including hard paternalistic, policies.4
*
Matthews University Distinguished Professor of Law, Northeastern University School of Law.
I wish to thank Julian Canzoneri and Caitlin Perry for their outstanding research assistance and Peter
Jacobson for his helpful comments on an earlier draft of this Article. All errors are my own.
1
David Adam Friedman, Public Health Regulation and the Limits of Paternalism, 46 CONN. L.
REV. 1687, 1693 (2014). Friedman’s use of the word “natural” is intriguing. As will be discussed, I
question whether the limits that public health is facing are based on paternalism. Even if they are, there
is no reason to believe that the limits are “natural” and not contingent on the social and political culture
of contemporary American society. See infra Part III.
2
Friedman, supra note 1, at 1769; see also N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of
Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, 23 N.Y.3d 681, 690 (2014) (finding that the
Board of Health lacked authority to ban the sale of large sugary sodas).
3
See Friedman, supra note 1, at 1765 (explaining that the rejection of paternalism will hurt “the
future use of regulatory tools” to combat public health problems such as obesity). Friedman is hardly
alone in seeing debates about paternalism as central to arguments about the appropriateness of public
health interventions. See, e.g., L.O. Gostin & K.G. Gostin, A Broader Liberty: J.S. Mill, Paternalism
and the Public’s Health, 123 PUB. HEALTH 214, 215 (2009) (arguing that the “political community
should at least be open to the idea of paternalism to prevent or ameliorate harms in the population”);
Lindsay F. Wiley et al., Who’s Your Nanny?: Choice, Paternalism and Public Health in the Age of
Personal Responsibility, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 88, 88 (Supp. 2013) (noting that arguments about
paternalism “have cultural and political resonance”). Indeed, leading critics of the so-called “new
public health” have assailed it at least in part for being paternalistic. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein,
What (Not) to Do About Obesity: A Moderate Aristotelian Answer, 93 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1364 (2005)
(presenting an argument against government intervention); Mark A. Hall, The Scope and Limits of
Public Health Law, 46 PERSP. IN BIOLOGY & MED. S199, S208 (Supp. 2003) (“[P]ublic health
advocates seriously overstep their bounds when they call on government to address broad economic
and political conditions as public health problems . . . .”).
4
See Friedman, supra note 1, at 1719 (“The only real way to solve the obesity problem in the
United States . . . would be to press forward with solutions on every dimension of the problem.”).
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In the face of this dilemma, Friedman seeks to provide policymakers
with a guide for the effective use of paternalistic public health
interventions. Drawing heavily on the insights of behavioral economics
and the work of Christine Jolls and Cass Sunstein,5 Friedman presents a
spectrum of what he describes as five increasingly “hard” levels of
intervention, ranging from those that are apaternalistic (and rely on the
market), to debiasing strategies, insulating strategies (including subsidies
and taxes), and the most “hard” form of paternalism, bans or mandates.6
With great detail, Friedman explores different types of strategies that can
be used to combat obesity within each of the levels on his spectrum. He
also provides keen insights from the reaction to, and success or failure of,
different regulatory tools in the areas of fluoridation, marijuana, and the
regulation of genetically-modified foods or genetically-modified organisms
(GMOs).7 In so doing, Friedman exposes the thick particularity of public
health policymaking. For example, while he suggests that “softer”
interventions are generally less likely to raise the public’s ire, even calls
for voluntarism have provoked a backlash in some circumstances.8 In
other cases, such as with trans fats, outright bans have encountered little
resistance.9 The devil, it seems, does lie in the details through which
Friedman guides us.
Despite the context-laden nature of his analysis, Friedman draws some
important general conclusions. One is that “[i]f regulators minimize the
perception that they are reducing autonomy,” its restriction might prove
more palatable.10 A second is that “if regulators examine the entire
spectrum of options . . . they may identify a mix of initiatives that combine
efficacy with practicality.”11 Or to put it another way, paternalism may yet
be an effective public health tool as long as policymakers proceed with
knowledge, caution, humility, and maybe even a little guile.
Friedman’s analysis of public health interventions is rich and nuanced,
providing valuable reading for public health policymakers. Nevertheless,
Friedman’s premise that paternalism, particularly hard paternalism, has
reached its limits warrants fuller examination. Can we be sure that
paternalism qua paternalism has reached its limits, or is the recent outcry
against New York City’s portion cap rule and other public health measures
recounted by Friedman due in large or small measure to factors other than
a rejection of paternalism, especially in its hard form? Knowing the
5

Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199 (2006).
Friedman, supra note 1, at 1698–99.
7
Id. Part III.C.
8
See id. at 1723–26 (explaining that even a small level of government intervention can result in
harsh public criticism, as evidenced by the “Let’s Move!” effort).
9
Id. at 1709.
10
Id. at 1769.
11
Id. at 1770.
6
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answer to that question may be as important to the future of public health
policymaking as knowing the specific features of the various regulatory
interventions that Friedman discusses.
In this Article, I explore this question, revisiting Friedman’s
assumptions about the role that paternalism plays in debates about public
health law. My conclusions are tentative, but perhaps surprising: while
paternalism may be highly unpopular at this moment in the American
polity, it is neither as critical for public health protection nor as central to
the backlash against legal interventions as Friedman presumes.12 Public
health law is facing extraordinary challenges, but to respond to them we
need to both better understand, and move beyond, the paternalism debate.
I begin in Part II by reviewing what is meant by paternalism, as well as
the concepts of hard and soft paternalism. This discussion leads me to
argue that many public health interventions should not be understood as
exercises of paternalism. In Part III, I problematize Friedman’s assertion
that paternalism has met its limits, suggesting instead a variety of other
ways to view public health laws as well as the criticism they face. In
Part IV, I offer a different defense of public health laws, one grounded less
on an acceptance of paternalism than on the recognition of the liberty to
self-govern. This defense, I suggest, provides a different perspective on
the “nanny state” critique of public health laws; it also offers some
cautions about the value of guiding policymakers on the smart use of
paternalism.
II. THE PARAMETERS OF PATERNALISM
There is no question that public health law has recently been playing
defense.13 Over the last several years, court decisions concerning
12
Like Friedman, I do not discuss here the ethics of public health paternalism, an issue that has
been much mooted. See, e.g., SARAH CONLY, AGAINST AUTONOMY: JUSTIFYING COERCIVE
PATERNALISM (2013) (providing an ethical defense of the use of paternalism); Ronald Bayer & Amy L.
Fairchild, The Genesis of Public Health Ethics, 18 BIOETHICS 473, 485–92 (2004) (arguing that public
health ethics, as opposed to bioethics, may provide greater space for paternalism); David R. Buchanan,
Autonomy, Paternalism, and Justice: Ethical Priorities in Public Health, 98 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 15,
16–17 (2008) (questioning the ethics of using paternalism in public health); Mario J. Rizzo & Douglas
Glen Whitman, Little Brother Is Watching You: New Paternalism on the Slippery Slopes, 51 ARIZ. L.
REV. 685, 687 (2009) (arguing that soft paternalism is dangerous because of its inherent susceptibility
to slippery slopes). I also do not consider, except in passing, the role that paternalism or debates over it
have played in recent court decisions rejecting public health interventions. See infra text
accompanying notes 108–09. It is worth noting that when Friedman argues that paternalism has met its
limits, he seems to be referring to political rather than legal limits. For a discussion of the possible role
that the discourse surrounding paternalism played in the United States Supreme Court’s decision over
the Affordable Care Act, see Wendy E. Parmet, Valuing the Unidentified: The Potential of Public
Health Law, 53 JURIMETRICS J. 255, 272–77 (2013).
13
Wendy E. Parmet & Peter D. Jacobson, The Courts and Public Health: Caught in a Pincer
Movement, 104 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 392, 392 (2014).
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commercial speech, preemption, the scope of congressional authority, and
the status of public health evidence—among other topics—have eroded the
doctrinal foundations upon which many public health laws rest.14 At the
same time, the political and social climate has appeared increasingly
hostile to the use of law to promote the public’s health, at least with respect
to obesity.15 As Friedman shows so well, the efforts by former New York
City Mayor Michael Bloomberg to address the obesity epidemic sparked a
wave of ridicule and outrage, epitomized by the term “Nanny
Bloomberg.”16 Numerous other proposed public health laws, from soda
taxes to gun control measures, have met political dead-ends.17 And even
well-established public health legal interventions, such as vaccination laws,
have faced renewed resistance.18
But does this mean that paternalism, especially so-called hard
paternalism, has met its natural limits, as Friedman suggests? To answer
that question, several prior questions need to be addressed, including: what
is meant by the “limits” of law; what is meant by paternalism; and under
what conditions are public health laws paternalistic? We also need to
know whether the disapproval of public health laws that exists stems from
a rejection of paternalism or from some other factors. Likewise, to decide
whether hard paternalism is less palatable than soft paternalism, we need to
identify the factors that distinguish hard from soft paternalism and consider
14

Id. at 393–94.
The magnitude of the popular backlash may be overstated. While there is no doubt that several
recent public health efforts regarding obesity have been met with resistance, if not scorn, many public
health measures remain quite popular with the public, if not the courts. Compare Friedman, supra note
1, at 1719 (discussing “political resistance to paternalistic endeavors”), with Scott Burris & Evan
Anderson, Legal Regulation of Health-Related Behavior: A Half Century of Public Health Law
Research, 9 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 95, 106–07 (2013) (arguing that legal intervention on behalf of
public health is popular and that the central problem may be judicial, not popular resistance), and
Stephanie Morain & Michelle M. Mello, Survey Finds Public Support for Legal Interventions Directed
at Health Behavior to Fight Noncommunicable Disease, 32 HEALTH AFF. 486, 490–93 (2013)
(presenting the results of a national survey that shows support for government intervention directed at
health behavior that addresses noncommunicable diseases). For further discussion of this issue, see
infra text accompanying notes 74–80.
16
See Friedman, supra note 1, at 1689. For a defense of Bloomberg’s actions, see Lawrence O.
Gostin, Bloomberg’s Health Legacy: Urban Innovator or Meddling Nanny?, 43 HASTINGS CENTER
RPT. 19, 19–24 (2013).
17
See Josh Blackman & Shelby Baird, The Shooting Cycle, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1513, Part VI.B–E
(2014) (describing the rise and fall of public support for federal gun control legislation in the wake of
the Newtown tragedy); Anemona Hartocollis, Failure of Soda Tax Plan Reflects Power of an Antitax
Message, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2010, at A14 (discussing New York State’s failed soda tax).
18
See Phillips v. City of New York, Nos. 12-CV-237 (WFK)(LB), 13-CV-791 (WFK)(LB), 2014
WL 2547584 (E.D.N.Y. June 5, 2014) (rejecting a challenge to the New York City practice of barring
unvaccinated children from attending school during outbreaks of vaccine-preventable diseases); Saad
B. Omer et al., Vaccine Refusal, Mandatory Immunization, and the Risks of Vaccine-Preventable
Diseases, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1981, 1981 (2009) (noting that “increasing numbers of parents” are
refusing or delaying vaccination for their children).
15
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how those specific factors affect a law’s legal or political reception.
Unfortunately, although Friedman provides a valuable analysis of the
strengths and pitfalls of various public health legal interventions, his
analysis of these questions is at times insufficient and at other times
inconsistent.
Consider first what Friedman means by the “limits” to paternalism.
Although public health laws have faced some notable defeats in the courts
in recent years,19 these decisions have not, for the most part, relied on the
paternalistic nature of the laws at issue.20 Nor does Friedman rely on legal
doctrine to demonstrate paternalism’s limits; indeed, many of the examples
he gives of failed paternalistic interventions concern laws that were never
before a court.21 Instead, when Friedman discusses the limits of
paternalism, he seems to be referring to paternalism’s political, rather than
legal limits. He is making, in effect, the important claim that the public is
unwilling to accept, or is at least uncomfortable with, certain paternalistic
laws. For reasons I make clear in Part IV, Friedman’s recognition that
public health laws may be limited by public sentiment is an important one.
However, although public sentiment undoubtedly influences the
development of judicial doctrine, it is vital to recognize that political limits
are distinct from legal ones.
As for the meaning of “paternalism,” Friedman borrows from Gerald
Dworkin, who defines “paternalism” as the “interference with a person’s
liberty of action justified by reasons referring exclusively to the welfare,
good, happiness, needs, interests or values of the person being coerced.”22
This definition is similar to others common in the literature. For example,
in her recent defense of paternalism, Sara Conly relies on John Kleinig’s
definition that paternalism exists when “X acts to diminish Y’s freedom, to
the end that Y’s good may be secured.”23 Likewise, Thaddeus Mason Pope
states that paternalism is the “restriction of a subject’s self-regarding
19
See Parmet & Jacobson, supra note 13, at 392 (discussing the enjoining of New York City’s
ban on large sugary sodas and the defeat of FDA regulations requiring graphic warning labels on
cigarette packages).
20
See, e.g., R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1222 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (striking
down an FDA regulation requiring graphic warning labels on cigarettes as violating First Amendment
protections for commercial speech), overruled in part by Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760
F.3d 18, 22–23 (D.C. Cir. 2014); N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C.
Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, 23 N.Y.3d 681, 690 (2014) (striking down New York City’s soda
portion cap rule as being outside the Board of Health’s regulatory authority). For further discussion of
the New York Court of Appeals’ rejection of the portion cap rule, see infra notes 108–09.
21
See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 1, at 1732–33 (discussing a Mississippi statute prohibiting
localities from requiring fast-food establishments from posting calories).
22
Id. at 1695 (quoting Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism, 56 THE MONIST 64, 65 (1972)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Although paternalism requires the restriction of liberty, it may also enhance
liberty. See infra text accompanying notes 96–98.
23
CONLY, supra note 12, at 17 (quoting JOHN KLEINIG, PATERNALISM 18 (1984)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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conduct primarily for the good of the same subject.”
Under each of these definitions, paternalistic laws are distinguished
from other laws in that they regulate self-regarding rather than otherregarding behavior.25 Moreover, they regulate behavior in order to benefit
the individual whose behavior is in question. Thus a law that limits the
liberty of one person X in order to benefit another Y is not rightly speaking
paternalistic, even if it seeks to benefit Y by influencing Y’s self-regarding
behavior. For example, a law compelling a tobacco company (X) to
include a warning label on its advertisements is not actually paternalistic
because the party intended to be benefitted (Y, the would-be smoker) is not
the person whose liberty is limited.26 Put differently, the activity that is
regulated, tobacco marketing, is not a self-regarding behavior; like all
advertising, it is very much directed to others. Similarly, a law that limits
the liberty of a subject in order to benefit someone else is not ordinarily
thought of as paternalistic even if the law has the incidental effect of
benefiting the subject whose liberty is limited. For example, we would not
say that laws limiting speeding are paternalistic even though they may also
benefit the health of the drivers whose liberty is restricted.27 Rather, we
24
Thaddeus Mason Pope, Counting the Dragon’s Teeth and Claws: The Definition of Hard
Paternalism, 20 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 659, 660 (2004).
25
Of course, to paternalism’s critics, it is this focus on regulating an individual’s behavior that
affects only that individual that is problematic. See JOHN STUART MILL, On Liberty, in JOHN STUART
MILL: A SELECTION OF HIS WORKS 97 (John M. Robson ed., 1966) (“[W]hen the person’s conduct
affects the interests of no persons besides himself . . . there should be perfect freedom, legal and social,
to do the action and stand the consequences.”).
26
Cass Sunstein offers a different reason why such a law is not paternalistic. He writes that
“disclosure of truthful information is not ordinarily understood as paternalistic . . . [because] disclosure
requirements are meant to inform, not to displace, people’s understanding of which choices will
promote their welfare.” Cass R. Sunstein, The Storrs Lectures: Behavioral Economics and
Paternalism, 122 YALE L.J. 1826, 1865–66 (2013); see also Stephen A. McGuinness, Time to Cut the
Fat: The Case for Government Anti-Obesity Legislation, 25 J.L. & HEALTH 41, 54 (2012) (arguing that
disclosure laws are not paternalistic because they do not limit liberty). Thaddeus Mason Pope, in
contrast, contends that such laws are an example of so-called “indirect paternalism,” in that they try to
dissuade the individual from harms without the individual’s consent to dissuasion. Pope, supra note
24, at 687. This conclusion, however, eviscerates the distinction between the harm principle and
paternalism. All laws that limit the conduct of X to benefit Y can be criticized on the claim that we do
not know a priori whether Y would consent to limiting X’s liberty. For example, a law preventing X
from selling spoiled food would generally be thought of as one permitted by the harm principle. But
like the smoking ban, it can be claimed that the purchasers of the unwholesome food have not
consented to the law. Likewise a law prohibiting X from stabbing Y might be claimed (ludicrously) as
paternalistic in that it prevents X from harming Y even though Y might prefer to defend herself (perhaps
she thinks her honor is better maintained if she relies on self-defense rather than the law to protect her).
In both cases, the law should not be viewed as paternalistic because the goal is to prevent X from
harming Y. As Pope notes, quoting Dennis Thompson, “paternalism refers not to a distinct class of
actions but [refers instead] to a class of reasons that we may use [or may be used] to justify or
condemn restrictions.” Id. at 694 (first alteration in original) (quoting DENNIS F. THOMPSON,
POLITICAL ETHICS AND PUBLIC OFFICE 153 (1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
27
Sunstein notes that paternalism “does not include government efforts to prevent people from
harming others.” Sunstein, supra note 26, at 1863.
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recognize that the benefits that accrue to drivers who are stopped from
speeding are secondary to the benefits that accrue to others who are
protected from would-be speeders.
Of course, it is always problematic to evaluate laws by their “goals.”28
Laws—including regulations promulgated by administrative agencies—are
the product of many actors who may be motivated by multiple conflicting
or indeterminate goals. As a result, the task of determining whether a law
is paternalistic, i.e., whether it seeks the good of the subject whose liberty
is restricted, is invariably fraught with uncertainty. Some policymakers
may want to limit indoor smoking to protect the smoker; others may want
to reduce the risk faced by non-smokers. In such a case, there may be no
real way of knowing for certain whether a law is properly categorized as
paternalistic.
Yet, even if we can put the problem of determining a law’s motivation
to one side, there are reasons to question Friedman’s assumptions about the
paternalistic nature of some public health interventions. For example,
while Friedman posits a spectrum of paternalistic laws and policies
applicable to public health, he seems to accept that almost all public health
interventions that go beyond voluntarism or reliance on the unregulated
market are in fact paternalistic. He thus categorizes “efforts to improve
decision making by stringing data together into truthful narratives of harm”
as a form of paternalism that he calls “strong-form debiasing.”29 But are
such interventions—if we can even call them such— paternalistic?
Consider the example Friedman offers, Morgan Spurlock’s movie,
Super Size Me, a powerful documentary film that uses narrative to critique
and condemn the fast food industry.30 Even if we accept that Spurlock
created the film in order to influence viewers’ consumption of fast food
(and Friedman does not give us any insight as to Spurlock’s motive),31 the
film still would not be paternalistic because it does not in any way limit the
28
For that reason alone, it is problematic to conclude that some laws are unjustifiable simply on
the grounds that they are paternalistic. Take for example a law requiring cyclists to wear a helmet. If a
majority of members of the legislature believe that the law would reduce the incidence of lung cancer
(obviously a ridiculous belief), under the definitions cited above, the law would not be paternalistic.
Would that appease the law’s critics? I think not.
29
Friedman, supra note 1, at 1734.
30
Friedman does not explicitly claim that the Spurlock movie is paternalistic. Perhaps he simply
offers it as an example of a narrative’s impact. See id. at 1735 (“The 2004 film Super Size Me told a
compelling, salient narrative about the harms of fast food through the truthful tale of a thirty-day
journey of consuming nothing but McDonald’s food offerings.”). Still, he discusses the film at length
in sections of his article about “strong-form debiasing,” which he categorizes as a paternalistic level on
his spectrum. Id. at 1704–05, 1734–35.
31
Friedman does not tell us why Spurlock produced the film. Perhaps Spurlock merely wanted to
make money or create art. Maybe he wanted to harm the fast food industry because it had hurt him.
Although the answer to this question may be irrelevant to telling us whether the movie was powerful,
truthful, or influential, it is critical to telling us whether it had paternalistic aims.
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32

liberty of the subjects it seeks to aid.
Indeed, even if the film were
produced and promoted by the government, rather than a private party, it
would be a stretch to see it as paternalistic, as it still would not limit
anyone’s liberty.33 That is not to say, of course, that the film might not aim
to convince people to refrain from doing something for their own good, or
that it might not be troubling for any number of other reasons. But unless
it restricts liberty, it is not, properly speaking, paternalistic. It follows that
while there may be many valid and not-so-valid reasons to disapprove of
the government’s use of strong-form debiasing,34 a critique of paternalism
is not one of them unless the policy at issue is actually paternalistic.
Without question, as one moves along Friedman’s spectrum from
debiasing strategies to insulation strategies to bans and mandates, the
deprivations of liberty become starker and more apparent.35 Indeed, as I
will suggest below, Friedman’s spectrum should be viewed more as a
spectrum of coercion than of degrees of paternalism.36 That still does not
mean that each and every restriction of liberty undertaken in the name of
public health is paternalistic. The discussion of speed limits above offers
an example of a ban that restricts liberty to prevent injury to others.
Likewise, a law that bans texting while driving would readily be viewed as
one that restricts other-regarding behavior, and hence is not paternalistic.37
32
Friedman suggests that because Spurlock is a private actor, his film could be classified “as a
market-driven, apaternalistic venture.” Friedman, supra note 1, at 1704. Yet, as Friedman observes,
private actors can also act paternalistically when they limit the liberty of individuals, as parents do
when they “ground” a child. See id. at 1695 (noting Dworkin’s “distinction between narrow and broad
paternalism, with narrow paternalism describing state action, and broad paternalism further including
private actors”). It is not the private nature of Spurlock’s film, however, that precludes its classification
as paternalistic. It is the fact that the film does not limit liberty. But see Sunstein, supra note 26, at
1865–66 (suggesting that efforts to stigmatize a product might be described as a form of private
paternalism because it imposes psychic costs).
33
See Pope, supra note 24, at 686–87 (“To be paternalistic, the agent must limit the subject’s
liberty. . . . The intended effect in both the direct paternalism and the indirect paternalism examples is
the same: to prevent individuals from smoking tobacco and harming their health.”).
34
For example, such tactics may be misleading, ineffective, or a waste of taxpayer funds.
35
Friedman views conditional mandates (an insulation strategy in his taxonomy) as a restriction
of autonomy. See Friedman, supra note 1, at 1750 (describing how the Big Gulp ban in New York City
was a conditional mandate, one kind of insulation strategy that would have had minimal impact but was
still considered an “autonomy deprivation”). As he recognizes, this classification is questionable as the
subject continues to have considerable autonomy. For example, a lover of large portions of soft drinks
could have circumvented New York’s soda ban by buying two beverages rather than one. Id. at 1738–
39. Friedman, however, is correct in concluding that the government is setting some restriction on
autonomy by requiring individuals to make two purchases rather than one to attain the larger portion.
Id. Still, it is worth noting that consumers never enter the marketplace with unlimited choices. Prior to
the portion cap rule, consumers who wanted to buy small size portions often were unable to do so. The
law thus substituted a condition of the marketplace for one of the polity. In neither case was individual
freedom absolute, nor could it ever be.
36
See infra text accompanying notes 58–60.
37
Sunstein suggests, however, that such a law could be viewed as paternalistic if it sought to
override individuals’ judgments as to what is good for them, rather than preventing harm to others. See
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Often the question of whether a law aims to benefit the subject or
others is indeterminate, as the law may well be viewed as seeking to
benefit both the individual whose liberty is limited and others. The most
salient recent example of this is the Affordable Care Act’s so-called
individual mandate.38 Many critics of the law regard it as paternalistic by
forcing insurance upon individuals who would rather not be insured.39
Others view it as a form of redistribution that seeks to bring young and
healthy individuals into the insurance market for the good of older and notso-healthy individuals.40
As the above examples suggest, perspective matters. Policymakers
may have one goal and perspective, while those who are regulated may
have others. One challenge for those thinking about paternalism and
public health law is that many laws that seem paternalistic to those being
regulated may not appear as such to public health advocates and regulators
who share a population perspective. As I have argued elsewhere, public
health adopts a population perspective that prioritizes the good of
populations qua populations and treats populations not simply as the
summation of individuals, but as subjects.41 With populations in the
forefront, this perspective emphasizes the ubiquity of the influence of
social and environmental factors—the so-called social determinants of
health—on the health of populations and the individuals within them.42
From a population perspective, many interventions that appear to be
paternalistic from an individualistic vantage point do not qualify as such.
For example, in defending former Mayor Bloomberg’s initiatives against
obesity, Lawrence Gostin writes, “[P]ersonal choice is always conditioned
by social circumstances in various ways. The public health approach
rejects the idea that there is such a thing as unfettered free will, recognizing
instead that the built environment, social networks, marketing, and a range
of situational cues drive complex behaviors.”43 Note that Gostin’s
Sunstein, supra note 26, at 1863 (“My working definition of paternalism does not include government
efforts to prevent people from harming others . . . . By contrast, the definition includes government
efforts to override people’s judgments . . . .”). One possible distinction between a public health and a
libertarian perspective is how readily one is apt to view such a law as paternalistic or aimed at
preventing harm to others.
38
See 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2012) (requiring individuals to maintain minimum health care
insurance for themselves and their dependents).
39
E.g., Charles Krauthammer, Obamacare Laid Bare, WASH. POST, Nov. 1, 2013, at A19; Jim
Yardley, A Different View of Paternalism, AM. THINKER (Nov. 6, 2013), http://www.americanthinker.c
om/2013/11/a_different_view_of_paternalism.html.
40
See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2585 (2012) (describing the
mandate as a way of forcing healthier people into insurance pools to “subsidize” the costs of the
unhealthy).
41
WENDY E. PARMET, POPULATIONS, PUBLIC HEALTH, AND THE LAW 19 (2009).
42
Id. at 16.
43
Gostin, supra note 16, at 23.
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statement contains two rejoinders to those critics, such as Friedman, who
view most anti-obesity initiatives as paternalistic. First, drawing from
social epidemiology, but in close company with behavioral economists,44
Gostin questions whether we can speak intelligently about an “unfettered
free will” that public health measures restrict.45 If individuals develop
their preferences and goals only in the context of their social environments
and within the populations they comprise, the idea of an unfettered
autonomy denied by public health laws becomes problematic. Yet as
suggested above, if a law does not restrict autonomy, its classification as
paternalistic is problematic; and certainly it cannot be viewed as an
exercise of hard paternalism.46
Second, and perhaps more importantly for present purposes, Gostin’s
approach dissolves the distinction between self-regarding and otherregarding behavior. Once we recognize that social networks and
situational cues influence preferences, we must concede that behaviors that
initially appear to be self-regarding can have spillover effects that can
influence others to engage in unhealthy behaviors.47 As a result, laws that
appear from an individualist perspective to regulate a subject’s behavior
for his or her own good often appear from a public health perspective to
regulate behavior for the good of the group.48
44
See Friedman, supra note 1, at 1721, 1727 (explaining how personal autonomy is also limited
by societal influences and norms, as well as by genetics and personal preferences).
45
Gostin, supra note 16, at 23.
46
See Pope, supra note 24, at 687 (“To be paternalistic, the agent must limit the subject’s
liberty.”). This is close, but not identical, to Thaler and Sunstein’s argument that soft paternalism is
justified because individual preferences are affected by both bounded rationality and what they call
“choice architecture.” RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS
ABOUT, HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 3–6, 255 (2008). They urge policymakers to use law to
“nudge” individuals to the choices that they would have made if they were fully informed and fully
rational. Id. at 4–6, 255. But as David Yosifon points out, so-called libertarian paternalists continue to
assume that authentic individual preferences exist apart from an individual’s social environment.
David. G. Yosifon, Legal Theoretic Inadequacy and Obesity Epidemic Analysis, 15 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 681, 698–99 (2008) (“The three ‘bounds’ of the behavioral law and economics approach maintain
the basic dispositional perspective at that heart of the conventional rational actor model.”). The
population perspective, by focusing on populations, questions that notion.
47
See Gostin, supra note 16, at 23 (“[The] harm principle . . . argue[s], for example, that
secondhand smoke, increased medical costs, and lost productivity amount to harm to others and so are
not purely self-regarding. Third-party harms are not imaginary . . . .”); see also Elizabeth Weeks
Leonard, The Public’s Right to Health: When Patient Rights Threaten the Commons, 86 WASH. U. L.
REV. 1335, 1345–49 (2009) (explaining how individual self-regarding actions can negatively affect
society and others, while public health regulations can simultaneously be paternalistic and seek to
protect people from themselves and be for the benefit of others); Lindsay F. Wiley, Rethinking the New
Public Health, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 207, 261 (2012) (“Measures aimed at altering the social
environment in ways that influence health behaviors and outcomes are supported by public health
science . . . .”).
48
See Gostin & Gostin, supra note 3, at 217 (“[P]ublic health practices are ‘communal in nature,
and concerned with the well-being of the community as a whole and not just the well-being of any
particular person.’” (quoting Dan E. Beauchamp, Community: The Neglected Tradition of Public
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The disjuncture between the individualistic and public health
perspectives is easy to see in the case of vaccination. Vaccines are
sometimes defended as benefiting the health of individuals who are
vaccinated.49 Public health advocates, in contrast, value vaccinations for
their ability to establish herd immunity or, in other words, because they
benefit the group.50
But even some laws that are widely viewed as paternalistic do not
always appear as such from a public health perspective. Consider, for
example, motorcycle helmet laws, which Friedman presents as an example
of an insulating law.51 Critics of such laws contend that they aim to protect
the health of the motorcycle rider they regulate and any attempt to defend
such laws on the basis of savings to the public health care system is
disingenuous.52 From a public health perspective, however, helmet laws
may not serve to save taxpayers money as much as to influence the norms
of other would-be motorcycle riders who may be more likely to develop a
preference for wearing helmets if they observe others doing so as well. In
this sense, helmet laws act like indoor smoking laws in that they alter the
norms of the population.53
My goal here is neither to assert that the above-cited public health laws
are or are not paternalistic, nor to defend any of these laws from a
population perspective. Rather, I simply wish to suggest that the
relationship between paternalism and public health is far more problematic
and nuanced than Friedman, and indeed many public health supporters,
suppose.54 This not only raises questions about Friedman’s assertion that
Health, in NEW ETHICS FOR THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH 57, 66 (Dan E. Beauchamp & Bonnie Steinbock
eds., 1999))).
49
Wendy E. Parmet, The Individual Mandate: Implications for Public Health Law, 39 J.L. MED.
& ETHICS 401, 408 (2011).
50
Id. at 405; see, e.g., Sabrina Tavernise, Vaccine Is Credited in Steep Fall of HPV Infection in
Teenagers, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2013, at A1 (describing “herd immunity” in the context of the HPV
vaccine as a phenomenon wherein “people who are vaccinated reduce the overall prevalence of the
virus in society, decreasing the chances that unvaccinated people would be exposed to someone who is
infected”).
51
Friedman, supra note 1, at 1705–06.
52
Gostin and Gostin note that such justifications have been criticized as “strained attempts to
frame paternalism as coming within the harm principle.” Gostin & Gostin, supra note 3, at 219; see
also Thaddeus Mason Pope, Is Public Health Paternalism Really Never Justified? A Response to Joel
Feinberg, 30 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 121, 170 (2005) (citing cases concerning motorcycle helmets for
the proposition that “[t]he concept of harm to others is subject to limitless expansion”).
53
An individualist might reply that this is just an indirect form of paternalism, as the public health
advocates wish to protect everyone in the group from their own poor judgment. This argument
disregards the fundamentally different ontological stance between the public health perspective and the
individualist perspective. One sees the individual as logically prior to the group; the other views the
group (or population) as a subject with its own inherent characteristics and worth.
54
See, e.g., Ronald Bayer, The Continuing Tensions Between Individual Rights and Public
Health: Talking Point on Public Health Versus Civil Liberties, 8 EMBO REP. 1099, 1101–02 (2007)
(arguing for strong “paternalistic restrictions with regard to motorcycle helmets”).
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paternalism has reached its limits, but also about his typology.
According to Friedman, his five-level spectrum of interventions
classifies regulatory tools by the degree to which they rely on soft or hard
means of paternalism.55 At one end of the spectrum are “softer”
techniques, which “attempt to address cognitive biases through the
presentation of more information to improve the quality of decision
making.”56 At the other end of the spectrum are “outright bans, reflecting
hard paternalism.”57
Space here precludes a full discussion of the literature surrounding
cognitive biases, soft paternalism, and even so-called libertarian
paternalism.58 What is critical for present purposes is that Friedman’s
typology assumes a relationship between the degree of coerciveness of a
law and the softness or hardness of its paternalism. In effect, Friedman
classifies policies that are less coercive and leave the subjects with more
“choice,” i.e., policies that Thaler and Sunstein term “nudges,” or
examples of “libertarian paternalism,”59 as soft paternalism, and those that
are more coercive and leave the subject with less choice as exercises of
hard paternalism.60 This approach seems roughly compatible with that of
Sunstein, who writes, “[I]t might be best to understand paternalistic
interventions in terms of a continuum from hardest to softest, with the
points marked in accordance with the magnitude of the costs (of whatever
kind) imposed on choosers by choice architects.”61
Friedman’s association of soft paternalism with a lack of coercion (or
the maintenance of choice) is not unprecedented. As Sara Conly notes,
“The terms ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ may differentiate between the methods used to
induce paternalistic actions, where hard paternalism . . . [makes] some
actions impossible, and soft paternalism merely recommends incentivizing

55

Friedman, supra note 1, at 1698–99.
Id. at 1699.
57
Id.
58
See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 46, at 4–5 (noting that using “the term libertarian to
modify the word paternalism . . . mean[s] liberty-preserving”).
59
Id. at 5–6.
60
Friedman’s placement of different interventions along his spectrum is questionable. For
example, Friedman treats New York City’s portion cap rule as a conditional mandate that, in his
typology, is softer than bans or mandates. Friedman, supra note 1, at 1705–06. However, while it is
possible to categorize the portion cap rule as a conditional mandate, because consumers can continue to
consume large quantities of soda, it is equally plausible to claim that the portion cap rule was a “ban”
that barred a particular type of purchase. Indeed, Friedman uses the term “ban” in conjunction with the
portion cap rule throughout the article. On the other hand, Friedman treats regulations of school
lunches and SNAP purchases as examples of hard paternalism within a zone of control. Id. at 1744–47.
Yet these regulations can also be viewed as conditional mandates, since children can consume food not
sold in school, and SNAP recipients are not prohibited by law (only economics) from using other funds
to purchase junk food.
61
Sunstein, supra note 26, at 1859.
56
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62

certain preferable options.” But other scholars argue that soft paternalism
“protects autonomy by ensuring that the subject’s choices reflect her true
preferences,”63 while hard paternalism “may impose actions the agent
would not want even if aware of the facts.”64 Under this approach, the key
characteristic distinguishing hard from soft paternalism is the respect (or
lack thereof) given to the subject’s own preferences.65
Each of these different approaches raises distinct questions about
Friedman’s spectrum. If respect for the subject’s authentic preferences is
the key to determining whether an intervention is soft or hard, there is no
reason a priori for assuming that bans or mandates are necessarily harder
than debiasing strategies. After all, a powerful narrative (an advertisement,
perhaps) can momentarily induce an individual to take an action contrary
to his or her own “true” preferences and, in that sense, disrespect the
individual’s autonomous preferences without being highly coercive.
Conversely, a mandate might propel someone to do what he or she really
wants to do, but would not do in the absence of compulsion. It follows that
some laws that Friedman treats as hard, and which he suggests may be
more problematic for that reason alone, may actually be—depending on
the definition of soft paternalism used—softer than laws that rely less on
compulsion. On the other hand, if the distinction between hard and soft
paternalism is based, as Friedman claims, on the degree of coerciveness
(or, as Sunstein argues, on the cost imposed by a policy),66 then the
question arises whether paternalism qua paternalism rather than the use of
coercion has very much to do at all with the reception given to various
laws.
In the public health context, the use of coercion in the absence of
necessity may sometimes be problematic even when it is not paternalistic.
Thus, quarantines and other coercive communicable-disease-control laws,
such as mandated tuberculosis treatment and laws requiring the reporting
of communicable diseases, raise a host of both ethical and public health
problems even though they are not paternalistic.67 Indeed, lawyers and
ethicists have long employed concepts such as the least-restrictive

62

CONLY, supra note 12, at 5.
Pope, supra note 24, at 671–72.
64
CONLY, supra note 12, at 5.
65
Pope, supra note 24, at 673–78, 683–84 (defining both soft and hard paternalism).
66
See Sunstein, supra note 26, at 1836, 1859–60 (describing various forms of paternalism as
alternatively exacting “material,” “psychic,” “large,” or “small” costs).
67
See Wendy K. Mariner, George J. Annas & Wendy E. Parmet, Pandemic Preparedness: A
Return to the Rule of Law, 1 DREXEL L. REV. 341, 370–72, 374–76 (2009) (citing forced treatment,
patient consent, confidentiality, and Fourth Amendment strictures against search and seizure as ethical
and legal problems raised by public health programs).
63
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alternative, proportionality, and ladders of intervention to argue
against the application of any more coercion than is necessary to support
public health—even when the harm prevented is to others rather than to the
subject being coerced. Seen in this context, Friedman’s spectrum of
interventions has less to do with paternalism per se than with wellestablished cautions against the excessive use of public health powers.
III. THE LIMITS OF PUBLIC HEALTH LAW
So far I have argued that the relationship between public health law,
coercion, and paternalism is more nuanced than Friedman supposes. That
does not mean that he is wrong in claiming that paternalism has reached its
political limits. Some public health laws may be widely rejected because
they are viewed as paternalistic.71 After all, John Stuart Mill’s distinction
between the use of law to limit self-regarding and other-regarding actions
remains highly influential.72 Further, as Friedman suggests, the perception
that many public health laws are paternalistic, and problematic precisely
for that reason, is widespread in both the popular media and the scholarly
literature.73 Indeed, paternalism and the nanny state have become common
tropes in popular discourse.
Still, there are several reasons to question whether the rejection of
paternalism, understood as the restriction of someone’s liberty for his or
her own good, is as central to the problems facing public health law today
as Friedman and the nanny-state trope suggest.74 For one thing, many laws
68
See, e.g., In re Washington, 735 N.W.2d 111, 119–21 (Wis. 2007) (discussing a Wisconsin
statute permitting involuntary confinement of an individual with tuberculosis if “no less restrictive
alternative exists”).
69
See, e.g., James F. Childress et al., Public Health Ethics: Mapping the Terrain, 30 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 170, 173 (2002) (explaining proportionality as requiring that “public health benefits outweigh
the infringed general moral considerations”).
70
See, e.g., NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, PUBLIC HEALTH: ETHICAL ISSUES 41–42 (2007),
available at http://nuffieldbioethics.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Public-health-ethical-issues.pdf
(proposing an “intervention ladder” as a way of assessing the appropriateness of public health laws, in
which laws that are “more intrusive” are higher on the ladder and require a stronger justification).
71
See Sunstein, supra note 26, at 1853 (arguing that paternalistic laws regard people “as children”
and without “respect”).
72
See MILL, supra note 25, at 13, 96–97 (introducing and explaining the principle that limitations
of liberty are warranted only to prevent harm to others).
73
See Friedman, supra note 1, at 1690–91 nn.11–16 (noting a popular-press book and a plethora
of scholarly articles on paternalism). Thaddeus Mason Pope has argued that “[p]aternalism is at the
normative center of increasingly pressing public health questions concerning the permissibility of
restrictions on the consumption of tobacco products and sugary, fatty foods.” Pope, supra note 24, at
660–61.
74
It is also quite debatable, for reasons explained above, whether the distinctions between the socalled “new public health,” that tries to protect people from self-regarding activities, and the old public
health, that supposedly protected people from communal harms, are as stark as many critics of the new
public health have contended. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 3, at 1368 (demonstrating the new public
health approach through obesity, which is non-communicable and does not necessitate “coercive
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that are (or are perceived to be) paternalistic remain highly popular.
Friedman notes, for example, that despite being an example of hard
paternalism, trans fat bans have encountered little resistance, perhaps
because they do not appear to impose a significant cost on the population.75
And while he points to opposition in some localities against fluoridation of
the water supply as an example of anti-paternalism even where the
“science appears to be settled,” he also observes that some jurisdictions
have recently opted to retain fluoridation.76 Given the mixed results, it is
hard to say that fluoridation has met paternalism’s limits.
Many other examples of popular public health laws that are often
viewed as paternalistic can be offered. For example, the public seems to
want the FDA to do more to protect it from unsafe foods and drugs.77
Additionally, although seat belt laws are generally viewed as paternalistic,
a 2012 Minnesota report shows that they are now widely accepted.78 Even
helmet laws, though unpopular among many motorcycle riders, have
widespread support.79 Laws requiring food manufacturers and restaurants
to reduce sodium are also very popular.80
As Friedman shows so well, context and particularities matter. For
example, as the growing acceptance of seat belt laws and smoking bans
illustrates, laws that are controversial when first introduced often become
collective action”); Hall, supra note 3, at S204–05 (making the same point with fluoridation, but
concluding that collective action is “much more cost-effective than . . . individual responses”). For a
further discussion of the distinctions between the new and old public health, see Burris & Anderson,
supra note 15, at 108.
75
Friedman, supra note 1, at 1709, 1750–51.
76
Id. at 1762. Opposition to fluoridation, like opposition to vaccination and other public health
efforts, may be attributable, at least in part, to the fact that as prevention efforts become more
successful, the need for them becomes less apparent. See, e.g., Doren D. Frederickson et al., Childhood
Immunization Refusal: Provider and Parent Perceptions, 36 FAM. MED. 431, 436 (2004) (concluding
that “non-immunizing parents are aware that their children may be at lower risk if most other children
. . . are immunized”); Wendy E. Parmet, Informed Consent and Public Health: Are They Compatible
When It Comes to Vaccines?, 8 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 71, 74 (2005) (noting that the more
successful vaccination is, the less important it is for individuals). This relates to the fact that public
health is a public good that confronts collective-action problems. Parmet, supra, at 75; Leonard, supra
note 47, at 1339 (defining public health as an activity that aims at promoting public goods).
77
See Amanda Gardner, U.S. Public Lacks Confidence in FDA: Poll, HEALTHDAY (Apr.
30, 2009), http://consumer.healthday.com/public-health-information-30/food-and-drug-administrationnews-315/u-s-public-lacks-confidence-in-fda-poll-626405.html (noting that about half of the public
feels that the FDA “isn’t doing enough” to protect the public). For reasons discussed previously, many
FDA regulations may not in fact be paternalistic. See supra text accompanying notes 25–27.
78
For a recent review of the public’s acceptance of seat-belt laws in Minnesota, see FRANK
DOUMA & NEBIYOU TILAHUN, CTR. FOR EXCELLENCE IN RURAL SAFETY, IMPACTS OF MINNESOTA’S
PRIMARY SEAT BELT LAW 14, 15 (2012), available at https://dps.mn.gov/divisions/ots/seat-belts-airbags/Documents/dps-eval-primary-seat-belt-law.pdf.
79
Wiley et al., supra note 3, at 89.
80
Morain & Mello, supra note 15, at 490. Morain and Mello provide a chart showing that a
majority of the public supports a wide range of public health interventions aimed at preventing noncommunicable diseases. Id.

1788

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:1771
81

well-accepted (though not less paternalistic) over time. In addition, as
Friedman’s analysis suggests, paternalistic laws are more likely to be
accepted when the burdens they place on the public are minimal.82 It also
seems likely, as Scott Burris and Evan Anderson hypothesize, that the
public’s intuition about risk and causality affect its support of a public
health law.83 The public might be quite supportive of a law barring the sale
of E. coli infested meat both because the disease seems fearsome and the
law seems well-targeted. On the other hand, despite widespread
recognition that obesity is a significant public health problem,84 Americans
are most likely less afraid of it than of E. coli. So too, the relationship
between specific laws aimed at obesity, such as New York City’s soda
portion cap rule, and the obesity epidemic may appear, to many, to be quite
attenuated. Importantly, when it comes to perception, all risks are not
equal.85
Nor are all restrictions on liberty equally contentious. As Peter
Jacobson has noted, there is an important distinction between paternalistic
laws that limit fundamental rights and those that restrict lesser liberties.86
Under our Constitution, and in our political culture, a health regulation that
limited reproductive autonomy or freedom of worship would be thought of
quite differently than one that restricted an individual’s “right” to ride a
motorcycle without a helmet or smoke indoors. The short reason for this is
simply that in the latter cases, no legally-recognized “right” is infringed.
Not all exercises of liberty are rights.87

81
See DOUMA & TILAHUN, supra note 78, at 14 (showing that a seat belt law gained and
sustained public approval); Friedman, supra note 1, at 1747 n.340 (citing the proliferation of smoking
bans and restrictions).
82
See Friedman, supra note 1, at 1747–51 (citing the example of trans fats, the banning of which
caused little burden or loss of pleasure for consumers, resulting in public acceptance).
83
Burris & Anderson, supra note 15, at 108.
84
See PEW RES. CTR., PUBLIC AGREES ON OBESITY’S IMPACT, NOT GOVERNMENT’S ROLE: YES
TO CALORIES ON MENUS, NO TO SODA LIMITS 1 (2013), available at http://www.peoplepress.org/files/legacy-pdf/11-12-13%20Obesity%20Release.pdf (noting sixty-three percent of
Americans think that obesity is a significant problem for society, and not just individuals).
85
See Wendy E. Parmet, Public Health & Social Controls: Implications for Human Rights 11
(Northeastern Pub. Law & Theory Faculty Working Papers Series, No. 44-2010, 2010), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1546654 (suggesting that rare and overtly
symptomatic diseases are more likely to be feared, and therefore more likely to be addressed by public
health laws, than commonplace diseases).
86
Peter D. Jacobson, Changing the Culture of Rights: One Public Health Misstep at a Time, 51
SOC. SCI. & MOD. SOC. 221, 226–27 (2014).
87
This raises a crucial point: under well settled constitutional doctrine, state laws that limit
liberty, but not fundamental rights, receive a presumption of constitutionality, even if they are
paternalistic and highly coercive. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 722 (1997)
(explaining that a challenged state action must implicate a fundamental right before the courts will
require more than a reasonable relation to a legitimate state interest to sustain the law). In law, if not in
politics, the onus is on those who challenge such laws, at least under the Constitution. Challenges
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In addition, many of the objections that can and are made to
paternalistic laws are also laid at regulations of other-regarding actions.88
Although Mill’s harm principle condones restrictions on liberty to prevent
harm to others, the current anti-regulatory mood in contemporary
American culture does not only set a limit on paternalistic laws, it also
undermines support for laws aimed at other-regarding behaviors.89 For
example, health care workers have been surprisingly resistant to mandates
requiring them to be vaccinated against the flu, even though such policies
are aimed at protecting patients, rather than the health care workers
themselves.90 Public health and safety advocates have also failed in many
of their attempts to impose new gun controls, even though such laws seek
to prevent harm to others.91 Indeed, at times it seems as if the public may
be more willing to accept laws that regulate self-regarding behavior than
those that restrict other-regarding behavior. At least public health
advocates sometimes appear to believe that to be the case, as is evident by
their attempts to promote vaccines as something that individuals should
obtain to protect themselves, rather than to protect others.92 Perhaps, then,
the limits to public health arise less from paternalism than from a
resistance to regulation in general, one fueled in part by the record low
levels of trust Americans have in government.93 That lack of trust is a
problem for public health, but it is not a problem specific to paternalism.
IV. BEYOND PATERNALISM: PUBLIC HEALTH AND SELF-GOVERNANCE
In 1988, the Institute of Medicine (“IOM”) famously stated, “Public
health is what we, as a society, do collectively to assure the conditions for
people to be healthy.”94 This definition suggests that public health is an
enterprise that individuals or groups, coming together, do to promote their
based on a lack of statutory authority, in contrast, raise different issues. See infra text accompanying
notes 108–18.
88
See CONLY, supra note 12, at 115 (suggesting that attacks against paternalism are actually
arguments against legislation generally).
89
In this sense, libertarianism as a contemporary political and cultural force has a far lower
tolerance of regulation than does libertarianism as a political theory.
90
See, e.g., Wendy E. Parmet, Pandemic Vaccines—The Legal Landscape, 362 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1949, 1951 (2010) (describing health worker resistance to an H1N1 vaccine mandate).
91
See Jay Newton-Small, Gun Control Activists Seek to Reboot After Newtown Shooting
Momentum Fades, TIME (Dec. 13, 2013), http://swampland.time.com/2013/12/13/gun-control-activistsseek-to-reboot-after-newtown-shooting-momentum-fades/ (discussing the failure of gun control
advocates to effectuate change in the wake of Newtown).
92
See Parmet, supra note 12, at 268–69 (suggesting that vaccine proponents often emphasize the
benefits to the individual over the benefits to the population as a whole).
93
See Public Trust in Government: 1958–2013, PEW RES. CENTER FOR PEOPLE & PRESS (Oct. 18,
2013), http://www.people-press.org/2013/10/18/trust-in-government-interactive/ (finding that only
nineteen percent of Americans trust the government).
94
INST. OF MED., THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC HEALTH 19 (1988) (emphasis added), available at
http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=1091&page=19.
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own health. In this sense, public health legal interventions are not or
should not be viewed as paternalistic for two reasons. First, at least in a
democratic polity, public health laws should not be seen as the edict of a
disembodied policymaker seeking to benefit an unwilling public. Rather,
they should be understood as tools that populations use to benefit
themselves. In effect, public health laws are the means by which
populations achieve their own health ends.95
Second, and related, public health laws can be viewed not simply as
limitations of liberty, but also as exercises of positive liberty. Public health
laws are both the manifestation of the positive liberty of self-governance96
and a means by which individuals attempt to enhance their own autonomy
by reducing the risks they face.97 After all, while there may be freedom in
not being vaccinated, there is also the freedom that comes from living in a
community with herd immunity. Likewise, although indoor smoking laws
undoubtedly limit some people’s freedom, they also enhance the freedom
of others who can more easily avoid both the exposure to second-hand
smoke and the seductions to a habit they might prefer to forgo. More
generally, public health laws enhance liberty by freeing people from the
restrictions imposed by injury and disease.98
The merits of viewing public health law in this way, as an exercise of
and enhancement to positive liberty are numerous, and well beyond the
scope of this Article. For present purposes, one point especially relevant to
Friedman’s article warrants consideration. In his discussion of GMOs,
Friedman sheds light on how a popular movement can support interference
in the market in the name of public health.99 In Friedman’s view, “[t]he
GMO debate fits comfortably into the broader narrative about the limits of
paternalism in public health,” because legislation is required to protect
consumers from the “broader, hard paternalism of food producers.”100
That’s one way of telling the tale, but the same argument can be made
95
See Wiley et al., supra note 3, at 88 (suggesting that government regulation of public health is
actually a medium for the public at large to address their own public health policy concerns).
96
It is important to remember that this is the very reason why most public health laws,
paternalistic or not, are given the presumption of constitutionality. See Beatie v. City of New York,
123 F.3d 707, 712 (2d Cir. 1997) (asserting that “it is up to those who attack [a] law to demonstrate that
there is no rational connection between the challenged ordinance and the promotion of public health”
because the “Constitutional presumption in this area of the law is that the democratic process will, in
time, remedy improvident legislative choices and that judicial intervention is therefore generally
unwarranted”).
97
See PARMET, supra note 41, at 116 (“[T]he recognition of a positive right to population health
necessarily assumes that individuals cannot fulfill all of their goals, which presumably includes being
healthy, without the assistance or support of others.”).
98
Jacobson, supra note 86, at 222.
99
Friedman, supra note 1, at 1763–64. For reasons discussed above, a law demanding that food
producers disclose the presence of GMOs is not properly understood as paternalistic. See supra text
accompanying notes 25–27.
100
Friedman, supra note 1, at 1765.
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about many other public health laws that Friedman treats as
problematically paternalistic. Once we recognize that the market limits
consumers’ liberty (a coercion that is not properly understood as
paternalistic because it does not aim at benefitting the consumer), then, as
the advocates of soft paternalism remind us,101 many laws that regulate the
market in the name of public health can be seen as promoting, rather than
stifling, liberty.
So what is different about the GMO example from the other
purportedly paternalist laws that Friedman reviews? One possibility is that
the first clause of the IOM’s definition matters: “Public health is what we”
do.102 Public health laws that are strongly rooted in, and indeed arise from,
the public, may face a quite different fate than those that derive from the
good intentions of public health policymakers alone.
To be sure, in our complex and often polarized society, it is always
problematic to proclaim that any particular law is or is not popularly
rooted. After all, the views of social movements demanding public health
protection—consider for example, the movement that developed in
response to the HIV epidemic—need not be representative of the opinions
of the majority.103 Similarly, as in the case of enhanced background checks
for gun purchases, a highly mobilized group may undermine a law’s
political viability even if the law has broad popular support.104
Determining a law’s provenance—whether it derived top-down from
officials or bottom up from popular mobilization—can also be complex.
As Friedman pointed out in an earlier article, actions instigated by public
health officials can spark public dialogue,105 which in turn can lead to more
popularly-rooted laws. Moreover, popular movements can give birth to
broad administrative authority, as the genesis of many federal agencies,
from the FDA to the EPA, suggests. There is also no doubt that public
health protection often demands that broad authority be exercised even in
101
See Sunstein, supra note 26, at 1835–36 (identifying “hard” paternalism as highly aggressive
and “soft” paternalism as weaker, preserving the freedom of choice).
102
See INST. OF MED., supra note 94, at 19 (emphasis added).
103
See Gregory M. Herek, Thinking About AIDS and Stigma: A Psychologist’s Perspective, 30
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 594, 596 (2002) (“[P]ublic opinion surveys conducted in the early years of the
epidemic revealed widespread fear of AIDS, lack of accurate information about its transmission, and
willingness to support draconian public policies that would restrict civil liberties in the name of fighting
the disease.”); Joan Beck, AIDS Activists Shake Up the Medical Establishment, BALT. SUN (Jan. 14,
1992), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1992-01-14/news/1992014058_1_aids-activists-spent-on-aidsresearch (“AIDS activists have pressured research into unprecedented urgency and concentration with
their demands[] . . . [and] have insisted on and gotten far more than a fair share of money for research
and care.”).
104
Ted Barrett & Tom Cohen, Senate Rejects Expanded Gun Background Checks, CNN (Apr. 17,
2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/04/17/politics/senate-guns-vote/.
105
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the absence of a popular movement—consider the need for officials to
respond quickly to a pandemic or new type of injurious product.106 The
public may balk when public health agencies act without its support, but it
also hollers when officials fail to act in the face of a new threat.
Despite these complexities, if public health’s limitations on liberty are
justified because public health constitutes an exercise of self-governance,
the public rooting of public health laws remains important.107
Unfortunately, it is hard to view many contemporary public health laws as
exercises of popular will. Given the popular outcry against New York
City’s portion cap rule, it seems specious to view that regulation as
anything other than an edict imposed by public authorities over the
opposition of the public and their elected representatives. Importantly, it
was this very lack of approval by elected officials that the New York Court
of Appeals found to be decisive in striking down the regulation.108 In other
words, the soda portion cap rule was struck down not because it was
paternalistic and violated the harm principle, but because “it is the province
of the people’s elected representatives rather than appointed
administrators, to resolve difficult social problems by making choices
among competing ends.”109
A recent case from Ohio provides an interesting contrast. In City of
Cleveland v. State,110 an Ohio Court of Appeals reviewed a state law
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Importantly, I am not arguing that a public health law is only legal if it is rooted in popular
sovereignty. Nor am I saying that popular sovereignty is the only justification for a public health law.
My argument instead is limited to the point that popular sovereignty matters to the political limits of
public health laws, and that its absence, rather than paternalism, may help to explain the problems
public health law is facing.
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sovereignty.
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forbidding cities from banning trans fats, which was enacted in response
to a Cleveland city council ban.112 In striking down the state law, the court
relied on the state constitution’s protection for home rule,113 noting that
localities had the right to enact laws to protect the health of their
populations and that the state could not preempt the exercise of that right in
the absence of a comprehensive state public health law.114 In short,
although Cleveland’s trans fat ban represented a harder flavor of
paternalism in Friedman’s terms than New York City’s portion cap rule,
the Cleveland ordinance was viewed by the Ohio court as an exercise of
popular sovereignty, something that the New York court could not say
about the New York City portion cap rule.115
This distinction between critiquing a public health intervention on the
basis of paternalism rather than on the basis of its legal provenance may be
a subtle one, but it raises some significant questions about Friedman’s
analysis, as well as the future course of public health law.116 Most
particularly, it raises the question of whether the limits that public health
law is facing derive from a rejection of paternalism qua paternalism or
from a distancing of public health policymakers from the public they
serve.117 Has the public come to reject limitations on self-regarding
behaviors, or has it come to feel that public health officials are no longer
responsive to its concerns?
Friedman clearly believes that the problem is paternalism’s limitations
on autonomy, rather than the top-down nature of public health law today.
Assuming that the public’s skepticism of paternalism thwarts efforts that
he believes are necessary for public health protection, Friedman offers
policymakers (i.e., experts) a detailed and context-specific guide as to how
they can nevertheless achieve their goals. Chief among the advice he
offers is to go soft, be practical, and “identify a mix of initiatives that
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combine efficacy with practicality.”
However, if the rejection of the nanny state is based more on public
health officials’ willingness to intervene in the absence of popular support
than on disapproval of paternalism itself, efforts such as those by Friedman
to inform policymakers about the tools they should employ may backfire.
Indeed, if public health is facing a backlash based on its own over-reliance
on expertise and administrative authority, efforts to inform policymakers
about how to hide their paternalism—or exercise it softly—risk offering
policymakers the false assurance that they can promote public health
without first seeking the public’s active trust and engagement.
To gain that trust and engagement—to ensure that public health laws
are indeed the laws that “we the people” establish to protect us—public
health advocates need to rethink how they speak and, more importantly,
how they listen to the populations they serve.119 This requires a renewed
respect for the public’s priorities and concerns, as well as a deep awareness
of the limits of public health officials’ own authority.120 It also may
require a new humility about the scope of public health powers. With this,
I suspect Friedman would agree, as in his conclusion he wisely reminds
policymakers of the need to be “attuned to public sentiment.”121 In a
democracy, after all, the public’s views set the true limits to public health
law.
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